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favor.
of defendants.
In the Doran case the
the last clear chanee doct ne,
on the
that it
tiou. In the Bessette
on that doctrine.
i11strnction \Vas
therefore the order
trial in that ease should
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should

evidence was insufficient to
ehance instruction in either case, and that therefore the order
affirmed. 'l'he evidence vras subthe same in both cases
that evidence in
the light most favorable to
39 Cal.2d
291
P.2i1

San
have nevertheless
be sustained.
On 1\iarch 17,
by defendants' electric overhead
crossing Union Street at a
west of the intersection with Fillmore
in San !<~rancisco. Plaintiff Jules
by plaintiff
,Jeanne Doran, had
his automobile on the south side
of Union Street, about 100 feet >Yest of Pillmore. Union
Street is relatively narrow,
44 feet 9 inches from curb
to curb, and there were cars parked at the curbs on both
sides. After leaving their car and proceeding west on the
sidewalk about a car's length, plaintiffs stepped into Union
Street intending to cross the street to a theatre on the opposite (north) side. Defendants'
trawling west
in front
on Union Strert, had crossed Fillmore and
of a drugstore on the northwest corner of the intersection.
rrhere "·ere two sets of strcrt<:a trar·ks on Union
aJ1(1
the bus was
to the curb with its right wheels
to the right of the most northerly rail of the car tracks.
Plaintiffs testified that after
had
into Union
Street and were a few feet from the south
they stopped,
"looked around," observed the bus stopped to their right
at the corner but saw no moving traffic, and then proceeded
straight, not diagonally, aeross the street. ·when
reaehed
tbe center of the street and were between the hvo sets of
they looked again to the
and saw the bus moving
their direction. \Vhen plaintiff Bessette saw the bus for
the second time, he ''could not tell if it moyed any distanee
from the point where he first saw it when it was stopped."
Plaintiff Doran testified: "\Vnen 1 1-ras in the middle of the
I don't know how far the bus was from me. I know
the bus was going in my direction . . . . I cannot tell you if
had gone half way. I don't know if it 1vas as close as 10
44

C.2d~16

\Vere on
theatre marquee and
lights
\Yere
ahead from his
position at
the corner in front of the
the bus driver could see
cars the full
of the block on both sides of the
street and there \vas nothing in the street to obstruct his
view. After
the bus, he traveled some two or three
coach lengths
coach length i8 85 fe(~t) before he saw plaintiffs. He then immediately applied his brakes and swerved
to the
but the
front half of the bus struck plaintiffs.
The bus traveled 4 to 6 feet between the
of impact and
the stop. 'fraveling at the speed of 15 to 20 miles per hour
when he first saw plaintiffs, he stated that he could stop the
bus within 23 to 26
including reaction time. He did not
sound his horn but nsed both hands to turn the steering wheel
an effort to aYoid striking plaintiffs. He could not state
he did not see plaintiffs soonrr in the
except for
these preYailing circumstances: plaintiffs were wearing semidark clothing-plaintiff Doran in a dark brown coat, white
blouse and
and plaintiff Bessette in a gray suit
"sort of brmn1" oycrcoat; the stores on both sides of the
the corner drugstore and the theatre, both
>wre dark; and the southerly part of Union
Street was a dark 1Mekground at approximately the spot where
he first saw
[1] It thus appears that the
real conflict in the evidence 1vas on the
of whether plaintiffs walked straight,
or ran diagonally, aeross the street and into the path of the
bus.
' testimony, it will be assumed that
1valkcd
across. But plaintiffs' own testimony
further showed that they did not stop at any time in making
such crossing, and that they saw the approaching bus when
they were at the center of the street. Their own exhibits
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sette's

interval between the
and the time that the
accident occurreil. In this situation it
understandable that
plaintiffs should llave admitted that
did not know how
far the bus was from them when
the center of
the street or how many
the
center of the street; and in the
the abovementioned admitted
any
to the effect that the bus was still at the corner
teet
and -vvas just
to move at the tin1e that
plaintiffs crossed the center of the street is
improbof the
able as it cannot be reconciled with the
accident. Such testimony therefore cannot be deemed to be
substantial evidence on that subject.
[2] '\Vhether or not the doctrine of last elear chance
applies in a particular case depends wholly upon the rxistence
or nonexistence of the elements necessary to
it into play.
Th0 doctrine presupposes: "(1) That
has been
neg·Iigent
as a result thereof, is in a
of
from 1vhich he cannot esc-ape by the exercise of
and this includes not only where it is physically
for l1im to escape, but also in rases where he is
of his danger and for that reason unable to escape;
defendant has knowledge that theis :in such a situaand kno1vs, or in the exercise of ordinary care should
know, that plaintiff cannot escape from such situation; and
has the last clear chance to avoid the accident by exercising ordinary care, and fails to ex0rcise the same, and the
accident results thereby, and plaintiff is injured as the
mate result of such failure." (Daniels v. City &
San
supra, 40 Cal.2d G14, 619.) [3a] If any one
of these elements
the doetrine dors
and
and
696,
the doetrine is not
bt>cause plaintiffs were aware of tl1eir

here

C.2d

in crossing
in the path of
after leaving
and saw the bus
of the
but
therefore maintain
the approaehwere "totally unwithin the
of

to a11swer defendants' eontention relat

apparently
were iu a position
impossible" for
the center of the
into the
of the oncoming
upon their claim that they
their
'l'his latter claim
finds no
in the Pvidence. Plaintiffs concededly knew
of the prrseuce of tlw bus 11s they started to cross the street,
and also knew that it \Yas moving toward them when they
again lookPd to the
\Yhile near the center of the relat
llalTO\Y street.
\Vith this
they proceeded
to step tl
into the
of the oncoming bus; and in
t hr
it cannot be said that
[5] 'rotal
the doctrine, does
nmrwan'lwss of
JJUt exist \\'here
party is fully aware of the
of an
vehicle up to the instant before
the eollision and the11
attention to look in some
other direction ~while
direetly into its path.
Plaintiffs han~ eited no case in which the last clrar chance
to any comparable factual
situation.
, in a case which is closely parallel
011 its
it ,,-as held that the doctrine was not applicable.
(Palmer
191 Cal. 696.) There the plain1iff,
the eurb, glanced to her
ckfendani
automobile approaehing at a
200 feet. Slle started to cross the
stn•ei <llHI when she had takPn two or thrre
from the
she a;.win
to her right and saw defendant's
automobile still
of course, nearer. \Vithout

doctrine
there was evidence to
fa et "
Oil
, the
eourt found
11pon suffieient cridcnce that "up to the time of tl1e collision,
he
did not see and
oblivious of the
approf!ch of the
and the
(P. 200.) ln Cen/ct· v. fellow Cab
P .2cl 918], the cvidenc·e sh<rwed that the
iff "did not
see the
of nw automobile that struck him "
. 206.)
Ancl in t}w more reeent drcision of Peterson v. Burkhalter,
88 Cal.2d 107 [237 P.2d 977], there was evidrnce to shovv
that the injnrcd boy did not sec the defendallt 's oneomillg
autornobile. 1'he
in
ntersPction on his
motor scooter and "·hile 7i) feet therefrom
over
his right shoulder in the
as he
neared tlw iutrrscctiou he "was still
shoulder."
. 109.) Other eases cited
situations where there ~was eYidenee to show that the vrl1icle
in which the injnrecl
was either stalled
or stopped
was traveling.
(i43]; Daniels
City &
of San
40 Cal.2d GH: Sills Y. Los
Transit
GBO 1_255 P.2d
.) It thus appears that in each of tlw
eited e<JS!'" there was evideucc from Yrhieh the trier of tbc
faets cou1r1 ftnr1 that plaintiff's
}Jad placed bim
i11 a
of
from which he (·onld not escape by
the exercise of ordinary care either ( 1) becan"ie it was
"physiea11y impossible for him to escape" or
because
he was "totally 1111aware of his
aud for that reason
nnable to eseape." Under sueh
there was no
laek of t>VidcJH'(~ to s11pport a finding of the prrsenee of the
first n'qllif'c(l (·lr'llH'llt for the
of the last clear

'T·

the recent
that some
cases have ''
the suffi~
of the
of the
doctrine."
v.
supm, 39 Ca1.2d
297.)
It was further stated in the earlier case of Girdner v. Union
Oil
supra, 216 Cal. 197, 202-203, that any "apparent
eonfuflion which exists in some of the decisions upon the
arises in tlw application of the law to the facts, but
as to the rule itself there is little or no confusion.'' A summary of the rnles established by the recent cases may serve
to
any
confusion that may be said to exist
reason of certain earlier decisions.
The
presenting the issues of negligence and
is governed by the traditional rules
whieh eovrr those
and which make contributory negligence a bar to recovery by the injured party. [6a] 'l'he last
clear chance
vvhich relieves an injured party of the
results of his O>Yn contributory
and permits him
to recover
such negligence, is applicable only in the
exceptional case in which there is substantial evidence to
a favorable finding on each of the several required
elements above enumerated. [3b] And as above indicated,
if any one of these el .. ments is absent, the doctrine does not
apply and the case is governed by the ordinary rules of negligence and contributory negligence. (Palmer v. '.Tschudy,
700; Rodabaugh v. 'l'ekus, supra, 39 Cal.
supr·a, 191 Cal.
293; also Girdner v. Union Oil Co., su.pra, 216 Cal.
2d
197, 202; Daniels \T. City & Connty of San Francisco, supra,
40 Cal.2d 614, 619; Sills v. Los
Transit Lines, supra,
40 Cal.2d 630, 635.) [7] In this connection, it should be
that the "continuing negligence" of the injured
does not deprive him of the benefit of the last clear
chance doctrine if all the required elements for the application
of that doctrine are present, for such "continuing negligence"
ordinarily exists in all last clear chance cases. (Girdner v.
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Union Oil
supra, 216 CaL
203
Cab
supra, 216 CaL
207-208
supra, 38 CaL2d
104-105; Peterson
38 CaL2d
111.)

Yellow

[8]
in a
the absence
such
is error for the trial court to instruct the
that doctrine. (WaUis v. So1dhern Pac.
672 [195 P.
15 A.L.R. 117] ;
supra,
39 Cal.2d 290, 297; Johnson v. Sa.cramento Northern Ry.,
54
543 [129 P.2d 503]
73 Cal.App.2d 427, 431-432 [166 P.2d
[9] On the
other hand, if there is such substantial
conflicting
or
thr
of whether the defendant should
be held to haYe 1wd a last clear chance to avoid the accident
IS a
of fact to be determined by the
under
appropriate iustructions.
v. Union Oil
supra,
216 Cal. 197, 204: Center v. Yellow Cab
supra, 216 Cal.
v. Olsen, snpra, 38 Cal.2d 102, 106; Peter205, 208;
son v. Burkhalter, supra, 38 Cal.2d 107, 113; Daniels v. C·ity
& County of San F'ra1w1:sco, supra, 40 CaL2d
619, 622623; Sills v. Los
'l'ransit
supra, 40 Cal.2d
630, 635-636, 638.)
·while the determination of the
of law abovementioned is not free from difficulty in certain borderline
cases, the cited authoritiPs show that the courts haYc not
hesitated to hold that the doctrine could be applied wheneYer
it may be fairly said that there is substantial
conflicting or otherwise, upon which to base a
of the
presence of each of the required elements. (6b] These authorities recognize, however, that it is only the exceptional
case to which the doctrine may be applied, and that the mere
fact that there is ample eyidence to show that a defendant
is negligent, without substantial evidence of the existence of
the other required elements, will not warrant the application
of the last elear chance doctrine. (Rodaba.ngh v. Tekus,
supm, 39 Ca1.2d 290, 293.)
[10] The underlying basis for the application of this
doctrine, which permits an injured person to recover despite
his continuing and col!tributory negligence, is that defendant
was afforded a last chance and a clear chance to avoid the
accident after defendant had discovered that plaintiff was
of lavv; and
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accident that neither party may
last clear chance to avoicl
39 Cal.2d 290,
136 Cal.App. 22:1,
; Johnson v. Sacramento Nm·thern Ry ..
542.)
the
it is helpful to bear
in mind the deeisiom; ~which rationalize the last clear chance
doctrine in terms of
eause. ( Oirdner v. Union Oil
Co., supra, 2Hl CaL 1!17, 204; Center v. Yellow Cab Co.,
sttpra, 216 Cal.
207-208;
v. Redinger, ante,
p. 121
P .2d
.)
;\s vvaH said in the Center
ease at pages 207 -~~08 : "The doctrine of (plaintiff's) conhas no
unless the
is
cause of the injury. [13] If all the clements of
the cloctt·inc
the last clear chance are
and plaintiff's
becomes remote in
then the cloctn:ne
If, on the other
any of ihe elements oE the
courts have
and rightfully so.
continuous and contributory
~with that of defendant bars a recoyery."
(Emphasis added.)
rrhus, the doetrine may be applied only if it may fairly
be said that plaintiff's
was "remote in eansation.'' [14] ~What then is the main factor whieh may malu'
plaintiff's
in the eyes of the law, a remote eausr
rather than a
cause of the aeeident? It is obYionsly
the existenee of some such
interval after the
time that
intiff has reachrd a state of helplessness as to
enable defem1ant to
aetual
of plaintiff's state
of
aml to have a last c.lear chance to avoid the
sneh stale of hdplrssness
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ng of the
intl'rYal therrafter as to enable defendallt
10
's
and to have a
last clear chance to RYoid the accident. In such ease, the
of
i ntiff cannot be deemed to be ''remote in
eausal.ir,JJ." Ou the eontrary, t;Uch
m the
eyes of the law, a
cause of
and the
last ckar chance doetrine has
In the light of the above
it appears clear that
the cases inYolved on this
no substantial
evidence upou which to
applieation of the last
clear cha!lCe doetrine. \Ve llaYc heretofore indicated that
there was 110 eYidence to show that plaintiffs 'Were totally
Hnaware of the
. for
testified that
saw the
bus twice afln
the south curb-first
after lNtvlng the south curb and
~when in
the center of the strec•t. Jt is also clear that
cannot
sncc:•,c:;.~fully claim that defewlants had a last clear chance
i o avoid the accident
had left their position
center of the street awl
into a
Plaintiffs \\ere not in a position
of helplessness, \rithin the meaning
had reached a point where they
no
escape by the exercise of ordinary care.
As \Yas said iu Dalley v. Williams, supra, 73 Cal.App.
at page 435, "tfH~ term 'place of safety' ordinarily
includes the position of the plaintiff while he is merely
the place of
and so long as he is only
but is not
in a position of danger, the
cannot invoke the doctrine.''
[16b] 'l'he distance from the center of the street to the
north i·nrb was bnt 22 feet
inches. There \Wre antomobiles
alomt the c11rb, thus leaving
the interspnee for the
to operate along the northerly half
IJf the•
where the accident occurred at a point within
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center line of tlw street. Plaintiffs'
created
by tlwir ad of
m•ar the center of thi~ street and
the
of
Under any view
could not have taken more i han
after leaving a
of safety and before
rrherefore plaintiffs' act of negliof
and stepping directly into
bus necessarily occurred almost.
happening of the accident. Under
these
snch negligence cannot be deemed "remote in
'' and it cannot be said that defendants
thc·reafter had a last clear chance to avoid the accident. We
therefore conclude that in each of these cases the trial court
determinc•d
the challenged rnling that as a matter
of law the record presented no substantial evidence to justify
the
of the last clear chance doctrine.
& Connty of San Pmncisco, S. I~. 19190,
a new trial is affirmed. In Bessette v. City
San Prancisco, S. l~. 19191, the judgment is
affirmed.
Edmonds, J., and Schauer, J., concurred.
CAHTEH, J.-I dissent.
I cannot agree 'With the majority opinion for several reasons.
'rhe first of these reasons is that the facts have not bPen fairly
stated. ln
the propriety of the order granting
a new trial and of the refusal to give a requested jury instruction in these eases, the eYidence is to be viewed in the light
most fa yorable to plaintiffs. (Rodabmtgh v. Tekus, 39 Cal.2d
290 [246 P.2d 663]; Daniels v. City & County of San Pmn40 CaL2d 614 [255 P.2d 785].) The appeal in these
(:ascs is presented on settled statements of facts submitted
plaintifts with amendments proposed by defendants. The
from the settled statements, quoted in the majority
appear to be the excerpts least favorable to the
plaintiffs and most f<worable to defendant. In some instances
the excerpts attributed to plaintiff Doran have been taken
from the statement snbmitted by plaintiff Bessette. They
do not appear in the settled statement of facts submitted by
plaintiff Doran.
TESTIMONY OP BESSET'I'E

From the testimony of plaintiff Bessette as it appears in
the settled statement of facts, the majority opinion quotes:

.]
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·when he " . . . saw the bus for the second
lw 'could
\\here he
not tell if it moved any distance from the
first saw it when it >ms stopped' " Read in tlw
of
the majority opinion, these 1vords seem to
Bessette
did not know where the
when he sa-w it the second time. That
be the basis for the Jater statement of
were not totally unaware of
lmew that the bus \Vas
to·ward them wJ1rn
reached the center of the street. Head in the eontext in
which it was submitted to this conrt in the settled statements
of facts, this excerpt conveys a far different
Compare the \Yords quoted in the
which appear in the same o;cttlec1
facts as the testimony of plaintiff
opinioll apparently ignores:
"\Ve ·walked about 6 or 7 feet into the strrct.
then stopped to look for traffic. \Ve s<nr
traffic in either direction, but saw the bus
at tll~·
rorner near the drugstore, with the back whrel of the bus
into the intersection. The visibility vms
and
when I looked to my left (west) I was able to src beyond
Stein0r Street, and was able to see the houses up there."
"\Ve proceeded across the street and when I reached near
the center of the street I noticed that the bus was
beginning to move from the stopped
1t 'don' ' go
at all, it just beginning to move.' (Sic) I continued
across, going straight, not diagonally, and I don't remember
"·hat happened after that."
"When I was in the middle of the street 1 looked to my
right to see the bus, what the bus was
corner. As far as I could sec, the bus was
to move."
'' 'l'l1e last time I saw the bus it was northw0st of Fillmore
near the front of the drugstore. \Vhen the bns was
starting to moYe, it \Yas right thrre in the same place that
I was looking the first time. I neyer saw the bus after that.
I know I vvas walking to the middle of street but after that
I don't know what happened to me. ·when I was at the
center of tlJe street I didn't stop but eontill1Jet1 to wulk. I
know I was past t1H~ middle of the street >vhen the aeeident
occurred but I don't know how far past."
"\Vhcn he "IYas looking' at the bus again to se~' what tlJP
bns was doing when he reached the center of the street ana

OF SA'< PRA'<m,.;co 144 C.2d

''ernwd to him ilmt be ha.d

"Port
's i
given
his
were read into the reeord in which he said: 'I did not see
the bus
befm·c it l1it mP.' fTp ean
hov.- f:ll· lw lwd
walked from his
wn m the l~enter of the strePt np to
the
knock;•l] 0111-,
he doesn't
kuow."
"He did not
bell or
other

''That
at 1hr tinw

:-i()lJl('

w·,•ident.

'Yes.

colored overeoat
:;;on of

' ~'
"\Vhen he first
the
tornPr, it \\·as abont 20 or 12;1 feet away
to look for 1railit· ·when he was
fl•et ont from the south enrb. ''
"\Vlwn he
to the micl<lh• of the strert
and saw the bus
; he could not
aay distance from the point where he first
\Y<lS

at the
from whPre lw
ahon1 G or 7
ltl' loukrcl to thl'
tell if it mowd
saw
when it

"

"\Vhen he looked at the bus a seeond time it was about
120 to 125 feet from him. Prom the time he left the side1Yalk
until the time he got to the center of the street the bus hadn't
moyed any distmwe at
it was still in the same
right then• at the eorner."
"I kne>Y the bns 1rns
in my direction but I c1id
uot alter the
of my >Yalk because I hacl
of
the bus was so far I took my eyes off the bus and 1 never
l<loked at it
to see -what \Vas
1o it."
"\Vhrn he
the center of the street am1 saw t hr
bns start to moYe, he never lookPd in the dirt'ction from whicli
and neYer looked at the bus again.''
c-lear that the brief
of plaintiff
Be"sette's
in the majority opinioll is llOt
tenor of his tesiimony.
as it is in tbe
it is
to
eonld }mye
found. lt
a
vit>w of the evidence in the
to plaintiff.
'I' he
kllew the bus
was eom
eart>)
h(riN far a way it was, and
i11to its path.
Tbe evidc•11ee Yiewec1 as a whole indicates to the eontn1ry.

tlw

that
feet

e<;l'll('f'.

120

of time.

from me.
l know the bus
in my (Urection . . . . I cannot tdl
you if it l1ad gone half
1 don't know if it \Yas as close
as 10 feet to me when I s<nr it the second time. As I was
the street. I know the bus was
tion but I don't lmow whether the bus was
fitop or
\nmld eoutinue to go
Let us
this
one sentence at a
and
eompare it ·with othl•r excerpts from the sauw settled stat<'nwnts. 'f11C• first se11terwe
is '' 'VheJJ ! was in the middle
lhlW far the bus 1ras from me.''
This sentence
in the settled statement of facts submitted
plaintiff Bessette. ft did not appear in the settled statement
of facts -;ubmitted by plaintiff Doran.
the
sentence with these
referring to the same submatter, whiclJ the
apparently
'' \Ylwn we reached the middle of thP street bc•tweeu the
l wo Sl'ts of tracks I
lookrd to the
) and saw
the bus in about the same
in my direction.''
"T sa\Y the bus a second time when I was about the middle
of the stn·(~t. The bus was in the same
ion mostly
::\Ir. Brssette
on my
"
"Before we got i o the middle of the street I was looking
and \Yhen I was in the middle of the street I >vas looking
the bus." "'l'he bus started to moYe when
l 1vas about in the middle of the street. After I started
across the street ·whrn I saw the bus down at the corner
I next looked to see where the bus was when I was in the
middlr. After tbat I dicln 't look any more."
Tlw infrreuce which thr
(lra>vs from the
sentence
it, is that plaintiff Doran did 110t know
how far away the bus was. 'rhe inferenee logieally to b1~
drawn from the wholP
is tlwt plaintiff Doran did
kunw abol!t how far away the bus was--she lDH'w that it was
s1ill at tlw ('('nwr, about 120 feet away.

C.2d

In

appear in
however.
which seem perl inrnt:

"

reached the middle of the street between the
looked to the right
and sa'\v
bns
to move
in my direction. "
''Wlwn I looked the second time the bus was moving. 1
can't tell
how close it was to me. I don't know if it
had
the
of the nearest corner.''
The inference "Which the majority apparently draws from
the
tenee which it quotes is that plaintiff Doran saw tlw
bus
at fn1l speed down the street toward her. 'l'he
evidence viewed as a whole will not support that inference.
inference which may be drawn from the whole
is that plaintiff Doran saw the bus still at the corner,
120 feet away,
beginning· to move.
'l'he third and fourth sentences in the quoted paragraph
of the majority opinion were "I cannot tell you if it had
golle half way. 1 don't know if it was as close as 10 feet
to me when I saw it the second time." Of the quoted parathese are the first senteHccs which actually do appear
in 1he settled statement submitted by plaintiff Doran. But
eompare them 'With these words, which also appear in plaintiff Doran's statement and which the majority ignored:
''When we reached the middle of the street between the
two sets of tracks I again looked to the right (cast) and saw
the bus in about the same position [about 120 feet away],
move in my direction.''
'"l'he bus was in the same position mostly [about 120 feet
and Mr. Bessette was on my right.''
"The bus started to move [from its position at the corner
about 120 feet away] when I was about in the middle of
the street."
rfhe majority picks OUt isolated SClltcnces which imply that
plaintiff Doran did not know how far away the bus was;
but the majority ignores the many statements in the record
ihat indicate that plaintiff Doran did know that the bus
was about 120 feet away when she was at the middle of the
street.
The last sentence in the quoted paragraph is ''As I was
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in my dir0ction
I know the bus was
but I don't know whether the bus was
to
or would
continue to go along.'' Again, there is
in the settled statement submitted
does not seem to be any direct reference in the statement
submitted
Doran as to
of "whether the bus ·was going to
go along.''
All of these purportedly
of
Doran's
were culled by the majority from the statement of facts submitted by plaintiff BE>ssette. I cannot under·
stand how, if the majority opinion was guided
the eontrolling principle that thE' evidence is to be viewed in the
light most favorable to plaintiffs, it cou 1d have
such
statements as I have quoted above. On the same page of
the Bessette statement that the majority quotes plaintiff
Doran as saying, "vYhen I was in the middle of the street
I don't know how far away the bus was from me," appears
the statement "vYhen I was in the middle of the street I
saw the bus just beginning to move.'' Can it possibly be
said that the majority views the eYidence in the light most
favorable to plaintiffs? Can it be said that the facts have
been fairly stated? I think not.
The majority paints a word picture of plaintiff Doran
walking to the middle of the street, seeing a large bus bearing
down on her, apparently quite close, and blandly
in front of it with no idea whether it would stop or not. This
picture is but a sadly distorted remnant of the original portrayal which appeared in the evidence. A clearer view shows
plaintiff Doran ·walking to the center of the street; seeing
the bus about 120 to 125 feet away,
beginning to move;
and continuing across the street vdth a feeling of apparent
safety; only to be struck down by the bus which rapidly
coYered the intervening distance.
TEsTil\IONY oF THE Bus DRIVER

The testimony of the bus driver is summarized in the
majority opinion somewhat accurately. Minor discrepancies
in the majority's summary include (1) " ... he was traveling between 15 to 20 miles per hour when he :first saw
plaintiffs . . . . " The testimony was that he was traveling
20 miles per hour when he first saw them. (2) "TraYeling
at the speed of 15 to 20 miles per hour when he first saw
plaintiffs, he stated that he could stop the bus within 23

the purpose
\Vllatevc•r· it was JJe(~rs
'l'hat the hus
np the whole st
(
np from the
he could see
and left and
in front.
'l'hat all of the
up to the tinw of
he was
ahead.
'fhat cars wen• outline(\
dearly <llld he had no trouble in
them.
) He
1Jac1 a
fie1d of vision
Yision) and 20-20
vision. Thrsc
' testimony
that whrn
\Yere iu the
the bus
\Yas still at the corner,
to move, could quite
lead to tlle inference that the bus driwr saw the
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).
would be little troubl<~ in
clear ehanc,,
doctrine is
that infcrenee eould be dravvn.
anrl vwuld be upheld on
since there is evidentiary
support for it. A
wonld not be bound by the direct
of the dcfewlant
driver. Even less bound by
defewhmt 's
>Ye, who are supposed to be viewing
the e\'i\lrnte
most favorable to plaintiffs.
Tlw majority
states that the only real conflict in
the eYic1enee \Yas on the
of whether plainti!Ts walked
siraight, or ran
across the street. Having set
up this (]efenscless ":straw man," the majority then strikes
it down by
'
that
this is
been
Y.

the
as reqnired by law.
Tckus. supm; Daniels v. City & County
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feels that it
the more
Tire
comnwnees 1vith the above mentioJJed cOJTeet
eoJJtinurs 1vith a distortion of the facts
seeks to prove that "there could not
interval between the time
of
and the time that
the aeeicknt oecurrecl." l:"r·om the eonJliet
evidence in
1!w
assume'; that tlw aceiilent oe1:1!1Ted
about () feet from the center of the street. lh·om this one.
isolated
itself 1ras eontradictrrl
tiH· dired
who te:;:tified thai to t hr best
six or seven
afi er
dte <:enter of the street before he was
the
attempiR to proY(' a measnre of timr by nse of a statement of
linear mcae<m·cnwnt. To prove that no appr. ciable time
while
took the six or seven Bteps, it would
br~ necessary to kumv the rate of
at 1vhieh
intiff\
The only direct r•Yidence of the rat'' of
of
' \Yalk is the
that
werP
walk, and that they didn't lmny,
or slow l1rnn1 ·while
the r;treet. 'fhe
facts from
which their rate of speed conld be inferred are the facts that
Bessette >ras 74 years
and that there 1nrc- streetear tracks in the street. Fr<;m tbrse facts it eou1d lw i11ferre(1
i hat an
\Yalk for
Bessette
b:~ slower
walk for a younger, more agile yonth.
110 evidenee in the record as to the
y or
Clearly, the majority \Yas forced to
un-vvarranted
the re·cord in order io
''llppol't the decision which it had
ly (1eterminrd it
wa~
to reach.
Continning >Yith the same paragraph, the
opiuioll
states: "In this situation it is HJI(1erstamlable tlw;
should have admitted that they did not h10w hrrw far the
lmR was from them IYhen
were at the ePnter of thn street
or hlrw many
th('Y to0k after
ihe eenter of tlle
;;;(n:et; all(l in the light of tlwse admissio11s alld ihc ahoYementioned 1Hhnitted facts~ any
of
ilfs t') the
effect tlwt the bus was still at the corner (a bout 120 feet
away) and \\·as
to moyc at thr· 1ime that plaintiffs cross1.•d the CPnier of the stre(•t is
iwprobahlP
as it cannot be rneoneiled with the l1appening of tlH' aceiclent.

Such
r•vidence
absolnte
in order to

arci~rnt

occurred
street. T snhmit
ablr> in
t
vnnll'L J~0 fct'i mn1y,
,.;j red.
'l'hc eYi<1cll~:e
started i lH' bus
tlw i1oor and that the bns rr•aehed the
of 20 miles an
hour before hitting
iffs. 'l'herc is not h
the evl(lcnce to indicate that the bns 11l'iver took his fout
accelerator until
i1Hlication in the n·i<len<·c of tlw 11wxin1
mathematicnl
a bn~
20 mi]('S per hour IYill eoY<'r i
120 to 12;) feet in le~c; thm five sccolH1s.
H llmYiug a reasonable time for ac-celeration. it \Yonld
possiblr for thr hlls to coyer the d ;nwr from the ('Ol'ner to
thr;
of
in not more than
mHl tl1at it \Yonl(1 be
a 74-ycar-old man. to take six or sen'n seeom1s to >Yalk SlX
•n· seven
across the streetcar !raeks.
may I ask,
ean the
fincl inhen•nt
in su<•h testilllOlJY?
It nm do so
by bl
disinferPllC'('S and dec1nctiom;
the
<'-;·idelH·e \l'hic·h has br•en
b.\~ at 1eust seYen
t }w record in the Doran case.
The rule has
been settled in this s1ai e that contradictions in the 1esj imony of H
even if the witness is the
t lw
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over
credible witnesses; and the mere
circumstances make the story of the
witnesses srem
will not justify a reversal by an
tribunal upon the
that the verdict is contrary
to the evidence.
v.
46 CaLApp. 493, 498
!189 P. 471 I ; see also Postier v.
121 Cal.App.2d 98
123 Cal.App.2d 853 [268
47 CaLA.pp.2d 832 [119
52 Cal.App.2d 255 [126
60 Cal.App.2d 125 [140 P.2d

.)
STATEl\fEXT OF PACTS

.tl.s stated
do not believe that the facts are fairly
stated in the
op1mon. The summary of the facts
to which the
opinion applies the law could conbe drawn from the submitted statements, but it is
not a Yiew of the evidence most favorable to
It is not cnm an impartial view of the evidence.
l t is a view of the eYidence most favorable to defendant.
different vrnions of the facts could be drawn from the
settled statements of facts submitted by the plaintiffs. I
propose that lYe
a version as favorable to the plaintiffs
as the eyidence ·will reasonably allow.
On March
about 7 :30 p. m., plaintiffs were struck
defendant's electric overhead trolley bus as they were

;)()O

Union Stn•et
from
to
curbs
on both sides.
west
Oll the sid('lvalk a bout a ear's
intu
Street
to cross the street to a th(•ater 011
the
side.
walked a fe\Y
into
1he
and looked both ways for traffic.
saw no moving traftie in either
bnt on their right,
-;aw defewlant 's
bus,
at the eorner of
Cnim1 and Fillmore
on the ·west side of
about 20 to 125 feet a\Yay from where
stood. The sun
had gone cl\r\YH and it ·was nighttime, bnt the
trw street well
They resumed walking
aeross the street. \Vhen
reached the middle of the street,
both
again looked to the
to sec ·what
tlie bus was
It ,,·as still at or near the corner, about
1:20 feet away, but had
begun to move. Believing that
had plenty of time to cross,
took their eyes off
tlw bus, looked
ahead and con tin ned
a eros"
1lw ~treet. They did not stop at the center of the street,
bnt looked to the
while walking.
the bus driver, \Yho had 20~20 Yision and
had si arted 1he bus
the al~cd~
('rator all the way to the floor. He was
in the clireetiou of
1n•re JJO ubstruc~
tions to his vie\\'. There \YilS JJO
from the insi(le lights
to interfere \Yith his view.
\Wre 011 low
but this 1n1s adequate to see all that was necessary to
be seeu for operation of the b11s. 'l'he lights lit up the ·whole
street from curb to t:nrb. He drovr straight ahea(l ui1til ht~
was within 15 or 20 feet of plaintiffR, at whieh time he pushed
on tht• brake
and turned the wheels to the left. 'fhe
right front side of the bus struck plaintiffs, and the bus
(~ontinued for about 8 feet after the impaet before it canw
to a stop. 'I'he
of impact \Vas about six or seven
north of the centiT of i he strePt, where plaintiffs last looked
to owr• the bus at the eonwr. 'fhe bus driver admits that he
did not S011lll.l hiR horn and that he did JJOt apply his brakes
when l1e first saw the plaintiffs, but he claims that he did
not sre them until he \Yas 15 or 20 feet away from tl1em.
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\Vith this statement of the facts in
let us proceed to
a discussion of the
of the last clear chance doctrine. The last
is applicable in very
cases. 'l'he case now before this
is one of those few
\Yhether
not the doctrine
out
the
or nonexistence of certain factual elements.
has
set out the nature of those
factual clements. \Vhat remains is to see 1vhether or not
those elements are
in this case.
Defendants contend that the doctrine is not applicable here
beeanse
were aiYare of their
position and
could haYe saved themselves by the exrrcise of ordinary care.
Plaintiffs may have been nrgligent in
the street in
Jl1e middle of the block wlwn 1h('re were marked crosswalks
Ht the end of tlJe block. Bnt it does not follow that they
werr aware of any danger from the bus. They saw it stopped
at the corner, walked to the middle of the narrow street,
looked again and saw it still at the corner, just beginning to
move. They did not look at it again, believing they had
plenty of time to cross. They took six or seven more steps
and were hit. Awareness of the fact that a bus 120 feet away
is
ng to moyc• docs uot eonstit nte mYareness of the
danger which actually \vas present. If it did, every pedestrian who crosses a
street would be in a constant state
of H\'.~arenrss of imminent
sinec 1l.ere is usually some
traffic moving· toward one when he crosses a street. The
evidence in this case, viewed reasonably, clearly shows that
plaintiffs were totally unaware of any danger.
'rhe majority opinion erronrously assumes that plaintiffs
wc·rr ''
aware of the approach of an oncoming vehicle
np to thr instant brforc tl1c collision . . . . " The majority
seems to believe that the plaintiffs were bent on suicide. It
intimates that the plaintiffs saw the bns right on top of
them and blithely ignored it as tlwy stepped into its path.
No reasonable reading of the evidrnr:c could give that imCLEAR CHANCE

The ease of Palmer v. Tschudy, 191 CaJ. 696 [218 P. 36],
which the
describe~ as "f:losely parallel on
to this case, because :it is elear1y
clistingnislwble on its faets. I agt·ee with tl1r learned ;justiees
of tlw Distriet Court of Appeal, who stated in their decision
that thr Palmer case \Yas not applicable to this case ((Cal

tion], was held in Daniels v.
[
, not to
where the driver
of the fact that the other person is
path." There is the additional factnal
Palmer case, that the
had audible
approach of the
his horn. No horn was sounded here.
Other cases which the
tinguishes (Girdner v. Union oa
915] ; Center v. Yellow Cab Co., 216 Cal.
Peterson v. Burkhalter, 38 Oa1.2d 107
all applicable to the extrnt at least that
who is totally unaware of the
in a position of
from which he
exercise of ordinary care; that it need
possible for him to escape in ord0r to
quirement.
It is interesting to note that the
summary of the "facts" near the conclusion of the nnn";r.n
states that plaintiffs were in
of
ncar the
center of the
and not in a
of
I had
thought that this
r"ily &
of
supra, 40 CaL2d
where the same writer held that the
of danger even though not
bns, bnt only
Daniels case was made in
point.
On the question of whether defrndant had
the
were in a
of
and knew
have known that plaintiffs could not escape, the evidence
clearly would support an inference that the
driver saw
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125 fret away from them. The
that be did not see them look in
no comment should be

proximately
OPINION

opinion is that
the erroneous and

on the last clear chance doctrine,
''The question of whether there
conflicting or other·wise, -vvhich
of the last clear chance doctrine
ol' law; and iu the nhsence of
for the trial court to instruct the
that doctrine. [Citations.] On the other
there is such substantial evidence, conflicting or
the
ol' whether i.he defendant should be
held to have had a last clear chance to avoid the accident is
of fact to be determined by the jury under approinstructions. [Citations. J ''
I know of
test for determining whether or not
there is an issue
1vhich slwuld be submitted to a
jury for its
and that is the so-called "reasonable minds'' test. I have never heard another test suggested
and I know of 110 other basis for determining this question.
In
this test it would seem that when a trial court
concluded that an issue of fact exists, and submits such
and the jury, on proper instructions, deterissue to a
mines that issue of
I can see no basis whatever in
reason or common sense for an appellate court to hold that no
issue of fact exists.
'fhis court has in numerous cases stated \Yithout equivocation that "Even ·where the facts are undisputed, if reasonable minds might draw different conclusions upon the question
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,

one of fact for the
154 Cal. 285
P.
18D Cal. 268
P. 1006] ;
Jfcrhcrf v. Southern Pac.
227 i P.
; Zibbell
IGO Cal. 2:17 I 11G P. 513] ; see clisCaL2d
1
P.2cl
Can it
be sait1 in tho ease
that reasonable minds cannot draw different eonelusions from tho evidence eontainod in tho record in this
case on the
as to whether or not the necessary
elements are
to
rise to the doctrine of last clear
ehance? The answer to this question is obvious. That reasonable minds have drawn different conclusions is demonstrated
by the record before us. 'l he trial judge in the Doran case
gaYc a last clear chance instrnction and the jury returned
a \'erdict in faYor of plaintiff. The three members of the
District Court of Appeal concluded that the evidence was
sufficient to support a last clear chance instruction (Cal.
App.), 274 P.2d 464, 275 P.2d 840, and three members of
this conrt haYe arrived at the same conclusion. In view
of this state of the record, it seems clear that the case is
cleeided in accordance with the view of the majority because
there are four members of this court who feel it should be
so decided, and it must necessarily follow that all cases of
this character will take the same course. The reasonable
minds test which has been followed by this court and all
other common law courts since time immemorial, is without
force or effect so long as four members of this court see fit
to arbitrarily conclude that the rule is not applicable to a
case involving a particular factual situation to which they
think the doctrine should not apply.
'l'he majority opinion in this case is an outright usurpation
of the fact finding function of the trial court in at least two
particulars: ( 1) It is held that the elements necessary for
application of the last clear chance doctrine were not present
as a nutfc1·
law; (2) it i,; hrld as a matter of la1v that the
defendant did not have a last chance or a clear chance to
avoid the accident. The nnsonndness of the majority opinion
on these two points is clearly shown by tracing the steps in
these cases. (The cases being joined in this appeal, and the
evidence being substantially the same in each, the Doran case
is outlined as the more graphic example.) (a) Evidence was
presented on each of the two points stated above. (b) The
trial judge, in the first instance, decided that these were
1
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therefore gave them to the jury for determination.
The
found certain facts to be true. (It
is not necessary to detail the findings-the logic is the same
in any case.) (d) The trial judge granted a new trial. (e)
The three able
of the District Court of Appeal unanidecided that reasonable minds could differ on the
evidence
therefore reversed the order granting a
new trial. (See Doran v.
& County of Ban Francisco
(Cal.App.), 274 P.2d 4()4, 275 P.2d 840.) (f) On appeal
to this
a majority of the court decides that reasonable
minds conld not differ on the evidence presented, therefore
affirms the order granting a new trial. As I pointed ont in
my concurring opinion in Daniels v. City & County of San
Francisco, supra, 40 Cal.2d 614, 628, by holding that reasonable minds could not differ, the majority of this court is
saying that the trial judge, the trial jury, the members of
the District Court of Appeal, and their dissenting brethren
on this court do not have reasonable minds. If the majority
opinion says any less than this, then the problem is one of
semantics. The law is clear; the logic is inescapable; the
only possible rN~onci liation of the majority opinion and
common sense must be found in divergence of opinion as to
the meaning of the words used. The meaning which I attach
to the words of the majority opinion shows to me that the
majority opinion is illogical.
This is not the first case of this sort to come before this
court. Nor is this the first time that the majority has followed this illogical course (see Rodabaugh v. Tekus, supra,
39 Cal.2d 290; Go1e v. lJfa1ket Bt1eet Ry. Co., 4 Cal.2d 154
[48 P.2d 2]; Young v. Southe1n Pac. Co., 182 Cal. 369 [190
P. 36]). Nor is this the first time that I have expressed my
views on this suhjeet
v. O!scn, snpra, 38 Cal.2d
102; dissenting opinions, Rodabaugh v. Tckus, supta, 39 Cal.
2d 290; Sparks v. Reclinge1, ante, pp. 121, 126 [279 P.2d 971] ;
eonrurring opinion. Daniels v. City cf County of Ban Francisco, supra, 40 Cal.2d 614; Recent Trends in Court Decisions
in California, 5 Hast. L.J. 133). Unless we wish to repeal
the portions of the Constitution of the United States and
the Constitution of the State of California which guarantee
the right to trial by jury, the result of this case must not be
allowed to stand.
I ·would commend to the majority of this court a reading
of the history of the development of the jury system (e. g.,
,James B. 'fhayer, The Jury and Its Development, 5 Harv.
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answer
trend of decisions in this court
on this bench do not
centuries of history which have
seek a return to the feudal system or some other
century form of judicial administration?
I would also recommend to the majority, a
and
a reconsideration of the analysis of this
was
made in my dissenting opinion in
39 CaL2d 290, 297, 303. The closing statement which I
made there perfectly fits the situation in this case. ''I do
not believe it can fairly and honestly be said that the record
in this case presents a factual situation on which reasonable
minds cannot differ. What has happened thus far demonstrates beyond question that reasonable minds have arrived
at different conclusions on the record before us. Such being
the case, under the well-settled doctrine, the issue is one of
fact and not of law, and hence should be determined
the
trier of fact-the jury in this case.
''-while the majority opinion in this case will crrate
confusion because it is in clear conflict with numerous other
decisions of this court and the District Court of Appeal which
I have cited hereinabove, of graver and more far-reaching
eoncern is the problem that it is in direet Yiolation of the
constitutional provision that 'the right of trial by jury shall
be secured to all, and remain inviolate' ; (CaL Const., art. I,
§ 7). It cannot be doubted that where a factual situation
is presente\1 in a ease in whieh litigants are entitled to a
jury trial as a matter of right, and the court takes the case
from the jnry and decides as a matter of law that there is
no issue of fact to be determined, the litigants have been
deprived of a jury trial, and the Constitution has been violated. Such is the situation in the case at bar. While this
result may seem to be unimportant in this case, it has an
insidious impact on our whole constitutional structure. If
judges who have taken a solemn oath to support the Constitution can rnthlcssly disregard its provisions, as the ma-
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from those
over 30
tlwse cases
of these rules to a
I think the d ifilculty
California is now
with
the result of the disposition of some members
the evidence and pass upon issues
of fact. I have called attention to this situation in some of
and
opinions, and I intend to
continue to talk about this matter whenever the opportunity
as I feel that such a policy or practice is not only
to settled principles of law but is placing an undue
burden upon the members of the Supreme Court. However,
I am
to believe that so long as the personnel of the
Court of California continues as it is prrsently conthis
or
will continue. I am hopeful,
however, that tJJe time may come when more consideration
will be
to the factual determinations of the trial courts
in cases of this
as I believe that it was the intention
of the framers of the Constitution to place the burden of deissues of fact upon the trial courts and that such
determinations should be
by appellate courts. I
am unable to reconcile the
of the majority in this
ease with this
I believe in constitutional government. I believe in obeyconstitutional mandates. I believe that the people of
this state have the
to
of the Justices of this
court that
\Vill
their oath of office and support
the Constitution of the United States and the Constitution
of California, and I believe that when the Justices of this
court decide that a party is not entitled to have a jury decide
issues of fact in case in "\Vhich such party is entitled to a
trial as a matter of right, they are not supporting the
Constitution and are violating their oath of office.
If a
of this court can deny a litigant the right
to a jury trial in one case, it can do it in a hundred cases
or it can do it in ewry case. It can thereby abrogate the
right to a
trial. That situation almost existed during
one
in the history of this court in railroad crossing
casrs. It has almost reachrd that point at the present time
in last clear chance cases and will contests. I am positively
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this court.
In the"e two eases,
meut

won1(1

the order and the judg-

GIBSON, C.
and 'I'UAYNOll, ,J.-\Ve dissent.
In our opu1wn tlw cYidenee was suflieieat to
the
of instnwtiolls ou the last dear cham~(' doetrine.
' pl'tition for a
19ii;i. 0 ibson, C. ,J..
opinion that the
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HOY A. SIIAHF':V' et al., Petitioners, v. THE STJPERIOil
COURT OF TilE CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN
1<-,HANCISCO, Respondent; BEI1F AST BEVERAGES,
INC. (a Corporation), Real Party in Interest.
[1] Mandamus- Acts and Duties Enforceable.--:\Iandamus will
issue, ·where there is no plain, speedy and adequate remedy in
ordinary course of law, to compel performance of act which
law specifically enjoins or to compel admission of party to use
and enjoyment of right to which be is entitled and from which
he is unlawfully precluded. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 1085, 1086.)
[2] !d.-Existence of Other Remedy.-Since an order staying all
proceedings in personn l injury action until plaintiff complies
with order to submit to oral and physical examination in
absencl' of her attorney is not appealable, and she does not
havP any plain, speedy and
in ordinary course
of law, writ of mandnmus is available to test whether court
hy its order has ·imposPd unlawful condition on plaintiff's right
to proceed to trial.
[3] Inspection-Physical Examination.-Colll't may order plaintiff
in personal injury action to undergo physical examination by
defendant's doctor, and doctor should he free to ask such
questions as may be necessary to enable him to formulate in-

[1] See Cal.Jur., Mandamus, § 6 et seq.; Am.Jur., ::VIandamus,
et seq.
[3] See Cal.Jur., Inspection and Physical Examination, § 4; Am.
Jur., Discovery and Inspection, § 5 et seq.
McK. Dig. References: [1] Mandamus, § 6;
Mandamus,
§ lil(6); [3, 4] Inspection,~§ 3, 4; [5] Inspection, 6:
~54

